Writes: Dusko JOVANOVIC, a representative in the Parliament of the Republic of Montenegro (Monday, 14th June 1999. “DAN”).

Not less important than political support is military support to the aggressor by the incumbent Montenegrin Government. It was indirect support for all time of the aggression. For the direct support there was not need, because the NATO land troupes’ invasion failed.
So, indirect military support to NATO aggressor by the Montenegrin regime represents the movements for the weakening of the Yugoslav Army and its defending powers. Significant enlargement of the members of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of the Republic of Montenegro, as well as prompt strengthening of the Ministry of Interior Affairs activities which was not directed towards the aggressor, had its planned goal to obstruct fight readiness of the Yugoslav Army.
However, fast technological and especially numeric development of Ministry of Interior Affairs or “Armed Forces”, as they are named by the Montenegrin officials, begun just before the presidential elections in 1997.
The reason is very well know to public, and that is significant help to one presidential candidate, as well as providing a part of missing votes through employing the police. In that way the candidate seized the position using his money and police, and the citizens of Montenegro are deprived of their rights on free and democratic voting.
The incumbent government in Montenegro, conscious of this way of taking government and knowing that citizens are conscious about the electoral process too, continues to enlarge the police because of security and political reasons.
The police was enlarged five to seven times relating the situation before starting electoral campaign in 1997.
The incumbent Montenegrin government, also deliberately encourages and helps creating of “parallel” police in certain parts of Montenegro. From the beginning of the danger from the NATO aggression and especially after the aggression, the activities connected with the mobility of police in Montenegro are much accelerated. This quick mobilization had two aims, and neither of them was connected with the aggression.
First of all, the fear of losing authority, because the paranoic fear from their own people for whom they thought was waiting the “opportunity” to overtake their positions. That fear they have had from the historical period in 1989, as well as fresh memories from January 1998.
Second, development of mobilization is to make it more difficult to the army regarding that the war was declared, because they couldn’t forbid mobilization. Considering the affiliation in police, the advantage was on the side of those who didn’t answer the military service of the Yugoslav Army.
Just to remind, the Army completed its duty of defending the country and it still does its duty very professional and completely apolitically. Also, Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro at the beginning of the aggression claimed that during the war it was not interested in the battle for the authority and that would use its potentials in defending its country.
The fear of the governing coalition was so big that the activities of Ministry of Interior Affairs were accelerated and they were going in the following directions:
- the uniforms of the Ministry of Interior Affairs were worn even by the persons with criminal history
- the police was enforced by the police from Republika Srpska (of course that the reformist Dodik would help to Djukanovic)
- the machineguns were installed on the public institutions as well as on the building of the television and the daily “Pobjeda”
- in the city center there were improvised military barracks in the hotels and bunkers made of sand bags
- the curfew was on the streets of Podgorica
The special curiosity was represented by the police bunkers on the border with Albania which were turned towards Montenegro, FRY and not towards potential aggressor Albania.
The purpose of these activities was not NATO aggressor, but making obstacles and discouraging of Yugoslav Army, as well as saving the “better living” positions in the Montenegrin government. Great number of honest people felt uncomfortable in the uniforms of the Montenegrin police, because they had to control and evident every citizen on every bigger crossroad in Montenegro.
This is necessary to be able to make the Vuk Boskovic’s warnings true. He was the assistant of the minister of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and he said to the citizens of Montenegro not to come out, except in the case of the working obligation.
In the daily “Pobjeda” on the 31st March 1999. the assistant of the minister claimed the following: “As the NATO INTERVENTIONS were directed to the military targets in Montenegro, it was completely justified the WARNING that the citizens should stay at their homes”.
It should be mentioned what the cooperation between the special forces of the Montenegrin police and their American colleagues was just before the aggression.
In fact, the American delegation according to the invitation of Montenegro or on their own initiative has completed the observing of the barrack of Ministry of Interior Affairs in Zlatica, in Podgorica. They had the information about the capacities of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of Montenegro and they were present at the part of the special course of the special forces of Ministry of Interior Affairs.
After this visit a number of the Montenegrin Special Forces’ commanders went on courses in America. At the beginning of the aggression they were ordered to come back.
During the aggression the aggressor offered the dedicated help to the Government of Montenegro for the financing of Ministry of Interior Affairs or the military forces of the Republic of Montenegro.
It is not necessary to be too smart to realize that the aggressor would not finance the military forces of Montenegro which were represented by Ministry of Interior Affairs if it was not sure that the same would not be used against it.
These examples tell us enough that the huge enforcement of police forces in Montenegro before and during the aggression didn’t have the aim to defend the country, but to defend the authority and to make obstacles to the Yugoslav Army to raise the level of the military readiness to the level which guarantee successful confrontation to aggressor and defending FRY.

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